THE UNBEARABLE LIGHTNESS OF APTing





WHO ARE WE?




Ron Pavidson

Head of Threat Intelligence and Research Check Point Software Technologies



Yaniv Balmas

Security Researcher
Check Point Software Technologies





Advanced

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APT



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APT HISTORY


	Cosmic Puke Pragonfly	Carbanak Equation
	Energetic Bear Regin Havex	Puque Babar 2015
		Casper Plugx
	Madi Flame	2014
	Shamoon 107 Subpab	Wiper APT1 2013
	Gauss 54	Red October 2012
Aurora	24	Machete 2011
	13 Stuxnet Puqu	2010
2	RSA Hack	github.com/kbandla/APTnotes

WHAT'S COMMON?



@AttributionDice

WHAT'S IN COMMON?



WHEN IN DOUBT...



It's probably China!

WITH GREAT POWER COME GREAT APTS












- A targeted campaign
- Has been active since late 2012
- Operation was terminated following our publication at March 2015



WHY VOLATILE CEDAR?



Explosive-443 31 32 30 35 31 40 3A 44 4C 44 2D 54 4E 3A 36 39 40 31 32 30 35 31 40 3A 44 4C 44 2D 54 4E 2 43 48 3A 74 72 75 65 3A 44 4C 44 2D 52 4C 3A 30 3A 44 8C 44 4C 44 2D 52 4C 3A 30 3A 44 8C 44 4C 44 2D 52 4C 3A 30 3A 44 8C 44 4C 44 2D 52 4E 3A 38 37 40 1 30 40 31 30 30 40 31 31 31 40 1 35 40 33 32 40 37 33 40 31 31

..DLD-VR:v3:DLD-VR=DLD-TN:69@120 @112@108@111@115 @105@118@101@45@ 52@52@51@:DLD-TN .DLD-RCH:true:DL D-RCH.DLD-RL:0:D LD-RL:DLD-RN:87@

105@110@100@111@

1190115032073011

Israel Confirms It Was Cyber Attack Target

By Barbara Opall-Rome

12:20 p.m. EDT June 24, 2015



(Photo: Israel Ministry of Defense

TEL AVIV — Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon confirmed Wednesday that Israel was the target of cyber attacks by Iran during last summer's Gaza war and by Hezbollah, which reportedly ran an operation going back three years.

Speaking at an international cyber security conference at Tel Aviv University, Ya'alon insisted "no significant damage" was inflicted by Iranian operatives, terror organizations and hackers who targeted government, military and economic sites during the July-August 2014 Operation Protective Edge.

Technologies, which reported to its clients in March that Israel, several Western countries and other Mideast states had since 2012 been targets of a sustained cyber spying campaign that the company believed was run out of Lebanon.

At the time, Check Point did not specifically name Hezbollah as the culprit for the cyber spying campaign, which the company dubbed "Volatile Cedar." It only noted that command-and-control servers supporting malware activities were traced to a hosting company in Lebanon, while several other servers were registered with "a very similar" Lebanese address. According to the cyber security and information technology firm, the campaign was based on Trojan horse computer malware planted in its targets, which was activated to collect data over extended periods.

"Monitoring these cyber infections was very challenging, due to the numerous ways in which they were disguised by the hackers," the Check Point report noted.

HEZBOLAH



HWBOLAH

- "Party of God"
- Islamist political and militant group
- Part of the Lebanese government
- Funded by Iran
- Official flag contains an AK-47




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PERSISIENT



THREAT

Targets were carefully chosen.


Other

Education

Civil Services and Gov

Hosting

THREAT



THREAT

##Data##: Active Window--> Migrated to PPA: Targets were ##EndDat Very specific We have changed your domain package and moved it to a new server. Here are your credentials: Link: https://ppa.uphosting.co.il:8443

Malicious ac
 Clip-board louser:
 Please change the DNS to those NS:
 Pdns1.uphosting.

Pdns2.uphosting.co.il

and

ADVANCED?!



ADVANCED?!



Kound 1 ATTACK VECTOR

STUXNET

Attack Vector

- Deliver USB drives into a super secured site
- USB Contains 4 0-days
- CPLink vulnerability
- Lateral movement via peer to peer RPC

Attack Vector

• The target itself might be a hard nut to crack.



- Look in its proximity...
- Exploit default un-patched IIS installations.
- Insert a web-shell and a key-logger into compromised servers.
- Use key-logging data for lateral movement.

Round 2 PERSISTENCE

EQUATION

Persistence



- Insert implant code into hard-drive firmware
- Support 12 different HDD vendors/variations
- Possibly infect boot sector

Persistence



- Install as a new service
- What if service gets removed\stopped?
- Use web-shell to restart\reinstall it

Round 3 COMMAND AND CONTROL

PIUGX

Command & Control




- Victim-side C&C servers are legit hosts
- A custom DNS resolver is used by the malware
- This DNS is hijacked and redirects to the C&C server

Command & Control



Command & Control

"Advanced"






Command & Control

"Advanced"

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Round 4 STITH

REGIN


Stealth



- Six stage architecture.
- · Use both user-land code and kernel modules.
- Store stages in a custom Virtual File System.

REGIN

- Six stage a
- Use both t
- Store stage





es.

10000

symantec.com

Stealth



- Create a dedicated thread to monitor process CPU activity.
- Once CPU usage is greater than the threshold
- Restart the process;)

Round 5 ENCRYPTION

EQUATION



- Usage of AES, RC5 and RC6
- A unique RC6 implementation designed for better performance.

Encryption

Reversed Strings.



google.com moc.elgoog

- Reversed Strings.
- Oh, wait... That might be too easy to spot
- Use Base-64!



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CONCLUSIONS

- "Advanced" is a very subjective term
- Dedication can sometimes be as effective as resources
- APT is no longer the sole domain of multi-billion dollar organizations.

MORE RECENTEXAMPLES

- The Spy Kittens Are Back: Rocket Kitten 2
 - Cedric Pernet Trend Micro
 - Eyal Sela ClearSky



ROCKET KITTEN 2 Threat?

"We believe the espionage factor and political context make their attacks unique and very different from traditional targeted attacks... This is an obvious case of politically inspired or motivated espionage."

"550 Targets, most of which are located in the Middle East...
policy research, diplomacy, all aspects of international
affairs, defense, security, journalism, human rights... Israeli
academic institution... scientists, journalists, researchers, and
sometimes expatriated Iranians living in Western countries..."

ROCKET KITTEN 2 Persistent?

"Numerous attempts to attack the same (chosen) targets for as long as necessary"

"Barrage targets until they eventually slip"

"The attackers do make up for these disadvantages with persistence..."

ROCKET KITTEN 2 Advacued?

"Simple tools and lack of professionalism... they don't seem to put much effort into quality

"The group is not very technically sophisticated... analysis of their code showed deficits and mistakes that a professional cybercriminal would not make... actors used off-the-shelf and low-quality tools""

MWI AS AN APT TOOL

- A new Word Document Exploit Kit
 - Art Villeneuve, Joshua Homan, Fireeye
 - "advertised as an "APT" tool to be used in targeted attacks"
- Microsoft Word Intruder RTF Sample Analysis
 - Omni Herscovici, Check Point
- Microsoft Word Intruder Revealed
 - Gabor Szappanos, SophosLabs Hungary

MWI CAMPAIGN TARGETS

Ministry of Education

An airline Carrier

Government Export Agency

The Municipalities Computation Center

The Supreme Court Network

The Social Security Authority

Government Aviation Authority

Medical Centers

A university computation center

THANK YOU!

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