



Cracking Xpaj: code and payload

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Security Response

Agenda

- File infection
- Code encryption & obfuscation
- Network communication
- Payload functionality
- Conclusion


Introduction

- Xpaj.B is difficult to:
 - Detect
 - Repair
 - Analyze
- Complex infrastructure
 - Encrypted communication
 - Ad-clicking scam
- Shows periodic evolution



File infection


User mode infector



- Infects random subroutines
- Variable size
- Virus body is fully encrypted
- Appends itself to an existing section (usually the end of .data)
- Virus body position is randomized, placed inside random data
- Original code is buried within the body virus

Kernel mode infector

- Kernelmode code exists in the virus
 - used for injecting a thread into new processes
 - Injected thread will
 - Download updates from C&C
 - Spread over network/removable drives
- Xpaj does search and parse drivers, but:
 - It specifically avoids their infection
 - No infected drivers have been observed




Code encryption & obfuscation

Cracking Xpaj: code and payload



First layer: stack based virtual machine

- Infection entry points are calls to the VM
- VM code and handlers are obfuscated
- Bytecode and viral body are encrypted



Second layer: obfuscation example

```
.data:0038DCF6
.data:0038DCF7
.data:0038DCF9
.data:0038DCFB
.data:0038DCFD
.data:0038DCFD loc_38DCFD:
    push    eax
    mov    eax, esp
    js     short loc_38DCFD
    cmp    edi, esi
    or     [eax+4], esi
    pop    eax
    call    sub_395428
    jmp    loc_38E043
; END OF FUNCTION CHUNK FOR sub_39582A
.data:0038DD0B
;
.data:0038DD0B xor    ecx, edi
.data:0038DD0D lea     ecx, [esi+ecx]
.data:0038DD10
.data:0038DD10 loc_38DD10:
    push    0FFE8486h
    call    sub_3A1B3C
; START OF FUNCTION CHUNK FOR sub_395B98
.data:0038DD1A
.data:0038DD1A loc_38DD1A:
    dec    esi
    push    0
    jmp    loc_395D0A
; END OF FUNCTION CHUNK FOR sub_395B98
.data:0038DD22
;
.data:0038DD22 loc_38DD22:
    push    3836C63Eh
    push    esi
    call    sub_389A84
    mov    [ebp-4], eax
    mov    eax, edi
    jmp    loc_3A531F
;
    add    ecx, [esi+28h]
    or     [esp-58h], edx
```

Junk code


Blocks scattering

Dynamic jumps


API resolved by hash

Second layer: obfuscation example

Just to give you an idea:



Obfuscated



Deobfuscated



Network Communication

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
C&C Communication

- C&C address in embedded configuration
 - send/receive data BLOBs
- Pseudo-random domain generator
- BLOBs are encrypted and verified
- BLOBs may contain:
 - New configuration data
 - Updated worm binary
 - Payload DLLs
 - Infection tracking information
 - Data about search terms hijacking


```
connection = datasource.getConnection();
connection.createStatement();
StringSQL = "SELECT * FROM ";
statement.executeUpdate();
```

Payload functionality

Payload at work




Ad-Click scam



Number of unique IP connections per day



Number of clicks and searches over time



Inside the C&C server: AdClicking scam

Earnings over time per day in USD




Total earnings in observed period of time: \$46404



Conclusion


Conclusion

- In time Xpaj added:
 - Encryption of virus body
 - Virtual Machine
 - Compression
- In the future?
 - Kernelmode infection
 - P2P functionality
 - Parse Http commands
- ... maybe!



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Questions

Reference

A detailed whitepaper about W32.Xpaj.B is available from Symantec's website:

http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/w32_xpaj_b.pdf