



“Want my autograph?”

The use and abuse of digital signatures by malware

Name: Mike Wood

Date: Sept 30, 2010

Agenda

- Digital signature fundamentals
- Signed malware
- Online fraud & SSL
- Implementation issues
- Lessons learned

Digital Signature Fundamentals

Purpose


- Authentication

- ... who are you?

- Integrity

- ... has what you've got been tampered with?

Signatures in the physical world...



Signatures in the digital world...

-----BEGIN PKCS7-----
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.....

.....

.....

Digital Signature Basics – Object Signing

Digital Signature Basics – Object Signing



Signer



Private key
(secret)



Public key
(for anyone)

Digital Signature Basics – Object Signing



Signer



Private key
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Public key
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The Signer signs an object...

Digital Signature Basics – Object Signing



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Public key
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The Signer signs an object...



Object

Digital Signature Basics – Object Signing



Signer




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The Signer signs an object...



Anyone can verify the signature...

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


Private key
(secret)




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
Digital Signature Basics – Certificate Creation

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A Certificate Authority (CA) issues a certificate to a Principal

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Principal
Public key


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
Digital Signature Basics – Cert. verification

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


Principal
Certificate

Digital Signature Basics – Cert. verification




Digital Signature Basics – Cert. verification




Digital Signature Basics – Cert. verification

The CA's public key bootstraps the chain of trust...




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


Digitally Signed Malware

Microsoft Authenticode Signature Basics

- Public-Key Cryptography Standards
 - PKCS #7 , x509, etc.
- Ensures authenticity / integrity of the EXE
 - ... for the most part
- A few references...
 - “Windows Authenticode Portable Executable Signature Format” ([ms docx](#))
 - WinVerifyTrust function ([MSDN](#))



Malware samples with digital signatures



* NB: 2010/09 only up to Sept 15



Malware Digital Signature – FAIL!

- Copy / Paste -- invalid hash



Malware Digital Signature – FAIL!


- MakeCert.exe – generated test certificates



“Root Authority”
Certificate
is not trusted

Malware Digital Signature – FAIL!


- Rogue custom generated certificates



Custom certificate
is not installed



Malware Digital Signature – OK

- Illegitimate company registration



Malware Digital Signature – OK

- Stolen/compromised certificates



Principal's
Private key
stolen

Online Fraud with Digital Certificates


FakeAV Payment Sites

fast-payments.com https://fast-payments.com/index.php?prodid=antus_02_01&afid=

 You are connected to **fast-payments.com** which is run by **(unknown)** Verified by: Equifax

 Your connection to this web site is encrypted to prevent eavesdropping.

[More Information...](#)

Fully Secure & Encrypted Ordering - Even Safer Than Over the Phone.  Your Email Address and Personal Information are private and NEVER resold.

Transaction amount: **\$68.45**
(Activation fee: **\$1.50**; Total price: **\$69.95**)

Enter your personal details (* as it appears on Your card and Your card statement)	Enter your card information
<p>First Name: <input type="text"/> Last Name: <input type="text"/></p> <p>Billing Address: <input type="text"/></p> <p>City: <input type="text"/></p> <p>State: <input type="text" value="Select State"/></p> <p>ZIP/Postal Code: <input type="text"/></p> <p>Country: <input type="text" value="Select please"/></p> <p>Phone: <input type="text"/></p> <p>E-mail: <input type="text"/></p>	<p>Select Card Type: <input type="text" value="VISA"/></p> <p>Card Number: <input type="text"/> <small>(no spaces, no dashes)</small></p> <p>Expiration: <input type="text"/></p> <p>CVC2: <input type="text"/></p> <p><small>PLEASE Your o Also cl not rec</small></p>



You are connected to **fast-payments.com** which is run by **(unknown)** Verified by: Equifax

SSL Certificate Re-use – FAIL!



This Connection is Untrusted

You have asked Firefox to connect securely to www.billingsuccess.com, but we can't confirm that your connection is secure.

Normally, when you try to connect securely, sites will present trusted identification to prove that you are going to the right place. However, this site's identity can't be verified.

What Should I Do?

If you usually connect to this site without problems, this error could mean that someone is trying to impersonate the site, and you shouldn't continue.

[Get me out of here!](#)

▼ **Technical Details**

`www.billingsuccess.com` uses an invalid security certificate.

The certificate is only valid for `www.bestbillingcenter.com`

(Error code: `ssl_error_bad_cert_domain`)

► **I Understand the Risks**

▼ Technical Details

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
Implementation issues

Revocation Issues – Safe Defaults

- Major browsers lack safe defaults


- Gap with IE8/Firefox3

Certificate Revocation Lists



- Check for publisher's certificate revocation
- Check for server certificate revocation (requires restart)
- Check for signatures on downloaded programs


Revocation Issues – Response Time



* NB: 2010/09 only up to Sept 15

Verification Issues – Permanent Timestamping

- Authenticode timestamps preserve signature indefinitely



Signature Timestamp Jan 25, 2010



Certificate Revoked July 16, 2010



Verification Issues – Any Root Cert. Will Do...

- Troj/BHO-QP installs a rogue “Verisign” root certificate

```

C:\> Command Prompt
Z:\jail>sigcheck directdbres.dll

Sigcheck v1.64 - File version and signature viewer
Copyright (C) 2004-2009 Mark Russinovich
Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com

Z:\jail>directdbres.dll:
Verified: Signed
Signing date: 6:12 PM 5/26/2010
Publisher: Microsoft Corporation
Description: Microsoft Direct ActiveX DLL
Product: Microsoft Direct Database
Version: 6.2900.5512
File version: 6.2900.5512

Z:\jail>
    
```

```

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Sigcheck v1.64 - File version and signature viewer
Copyright (C) 2004-2009 Mark Russinovich
Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com

Z:\jail>directdbres.dll:
Verified: Untrusted Root
Signing date: 3:55 PM 6/6/2010
Publisher: Microsoft Corporation
Description: Microsoft Direct ActiveX DLL
Product: Microsoft Direct Database
Version: 6.2900.5512
File version: 6.2900.5512

Z:\jail>
    
```

Infected vs. *Clean*

```

Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com

Z:\jail>directdbres.dll:
Verified: Signed
Signing date: 6:12 PM 5/26/2010
Publisher: Microsoft Corporation
    
```

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Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com

Z:\jail>directdbres.dll:
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Publisher: Microsoft Corporation
    
```



Rogue “Verisign”
Certificate installed




Rogue “Verisign”
Certificate absent

What have we learned?

Some things that we already knew...

- Cheap and anonymous helps out the bad guys
- ... a lesson from .cn tld registrar



Some things that we already knew...

- End users will get themselves into trouble



- ⊕ Have you scanned the file for viruses?
- ⊕ Did you ask for the file?
- ⊕ Do you know who published the file?
- ⊕ Do you know what the file will do to your computer?

[Related Topics](#)

No, that's what AntiMalwarePro is for!

Yup, I clicked on that 'cleanup' link.

The good folks at betasoft, of course.

It will cleanup my malware infection.

The AV Advantage... Automation

- Plenty of improper use/abuse fodder for detection
 - Broken signatures
 - Certificate x-domain reuse

The AV Advantage... Reputation Management

- Revocation is broken
- Certificate reputation
 - Fraudulent certs - Blocklist
 - CAs -- root vs. intermediate vs. compromised - Greylist

The AV Advantage... Enforcement Flexibility

- Auto-update mechanisms already in place
- Escalate decision to the IT admin

Thank you

Questions ...?