
(ENCRYPTION) TIME FLIES WHEN YOU'RE HAVING FUN: THE CASE OF THE EXOTIC BLACKCAT RANSOMWARE

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Aleksandar Milenkoski VB Conference 2022

What Is Changing?



CRIMEWARE

Crimeware Trends | Ransomware Developers Turn to Intermittent Encryption to Evade Detection


▲ ALEKSANDAR MILENKOSKI / M SEPTEMBER 8, 2022

NEWS ANALYSIS

Ransomware operators might be dropping file encryption in favor of corrupting files

Corrupting files is faster, cheaper, and less likely to be stopped by endpoint protection tools than encrypting them.

Why Is It Changing?



Agenda Ransomware

```
[...]
-encryption value
     Flag allow you to redefine embed encryptor config to your custom.
     Format Requirements:
     generic format: ./binary.exe "mode ; param1:val1 ; param2:val2 ; ... ; paramN:valN".
     generic format: ./binary.exe -encryption mode:param1:val2;param2:val2;...;paramN:valN
      'val' represents megabytes.
     All 'val' must be integers.
     If you want whitespaces inside flag - use double quotes (look at 1st generic format).
     Allowed mode and params combinations:
     Mode: 'skip-step'. Params 'step' and 'skip'
     Mode: 'fast'. Params 'f'
     Mode: 'percent'. Params 'n' and 'p' (p must between 1 and 99)
     example:
      ./binary.exe -encryption "skip-step; skip:10; step:20"
      ./binary.exe -encryption skip-step;skip:10;step:20
      ./binary.exe -encryption "percent; n:10; p:30"
     ./binary.exe -encryption "fast;f:10"
```

PLAY Ransomware


In contrast to Agenda and BlackCat, PLAY ransomware does not feature encryption modes that can be configured by the operator. PLAY orchestrates intermittent encryption based on the size of the file under encryption, encrypting chunks (file portions) of **0x100000** bytes. For example, <u>previous research</u> states that under certain conditions, the PLAY ransomware encrypts:

- 2 chunks, if the file size is less than or equal to 0x3fffffff bytes;
- 3 chunks, if the file size is less than or equal to 0x27fffffff bytes;
- 5 chunks, if the file size is greater than 0x280000000 bytes.

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00100020	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	0.0	00	00	00	
00100030	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00100040	00	00	38.00	00	00	00	00		00	00	00	00	00		00	00	
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001FFFD0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
001FFFE0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
001FFFF0	00	0.0	00	0.0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	0.0	00	00	
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00300010	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	0.0	
00300020	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00300030	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00300040	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00300050	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
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BlackBasta Ransomware

- all file content, if the file size is less than 704 bytes;
- every 64 bytes, starting from the beginning of the file, skipping 192 bytes, if the file size is less than 4 KB;
- every 64 bytes, starting from the beginning of the file, skipping 128 bytes, if the file size is greater than 4 KB.



000000A0

000000B0 00000000

000000D0

000000E0

000000F0

00000180

00000190 000001A0

000001B0

000001C0

Qyick Ransomware

"Notably Qyick features intermittent encryption which is what the cool kids are using as you read this. Combined with the fact that is written in go, the speed is unmatched."

The Exotic BlackCat Ransomware

ALPHV/BlackCat: A Formidable Rust RaaS Threat

Handelsblatt

"Black Cat"-Erpressersoftware: Staatsanwaltschaft ermittelt nach Angriff auf Tankstellen-Zulieferer



UPDATE 4-Shell re-routes oil supplies after cyberattack on German firm



ALPHV/BlackCat ransomware gang starts publishing victims' data on the clear web


The Hacker News


BlackCat Ransomware Attackers Spotted Fine-Tuning Their Malware Arsenal


Large Configuration Space

```
"config_id": "",
"public_key": "MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEApw3tWdMaWJvWt2Mejy5H0Y6kuj+lstNpwFyismGDEYhWKPps9c68xl+84o6uLKfqPzNvLnSxlVa6DitcJGeKJEQkzN+C1e1KsfzM63jHybREB2hs+dHbqBq4dbamI
OcTrrr4mKzuHJ7aok4mlpRx2Un1X0JaodoV7x0H07ui5v6uK39MJ3rvit5EBvv5oI@MDlp3IFmtd6UM6r2nvqYlncAUuasalZoF1Vaz7VX0WvX2ReOHbYWWRCR1qvKM0cBtiT5P0Xx9B8eklpnU4p65kGe9M79
4Bhhh20GN24gY5a+zwXwstaNT09luwd4xjjRQAVsDgjrjkzti27G11ICn6wIDAQAB",
"extension": "7954i9r".
"note_file_name": "RECOVER-${EXTENSION}-FILES.txt",
"note_full_text": ">> Introduction\n\nImportant files on your system was ENCRYPTED and now they have have \"${EXTENSION}\" extension.\nIn order to recover your files you need to follow
instructions below.\n\n>> Sensitive Data\n\nSensitive data on your system was DOWNLOADED and it will be PUBLISHED if you refuse to cooperate.\n\nData includes:\n- Employees personal
STRONGLY ENCRYPTED, YOU CAN NOT DECRYPT IT WITHOUT CIPHER KEY.\n\n>> Recovery procedure\n\nFollow these simple steps to get in touch and recover your data:\n1) Download and install
Tor Browser from: https://torproject.org/\n2) Navigate to: http://sty5r4hhb5oihbq2mwevrofdiqbgesi66rvxr5sr573xgvtuvr4cs5yd.onion/?access-key=${ACCESS_KEY}",
"note_short_text": "Important files on your system was ENCRYPTED.\nSensitive data on your system was DOWNLOADED.\nTo recover your files and prevent publishing of sensitive information
follow instructions in \"${NOTE_FILE_NAME}\" file.",
"default file mode": "Auto".
"default_file_cipher": "Best",
"kill services": [
   "mepocs".
    [...]
    "sql*"
"kill_processes": [
   "encsyc".
    [...]
    "sal*"
"exclude_directory_names": [
   "system volume information".
   [...]
    "windows.old"
"exclude file names": [
   "desktop.ini",
   "ntuser.dat.log"
"exclude file extensions": [
   "themepack",
   "nls".
    [...]
    "msu"
"exclude_file_path_wildcard": [],
"enable network discovery": true,
"enable_self_propagation": true,
"enable set wallpaper": true.
"enable_esxi_vm_kill": true,
"enable_esxi_vm_snapshot_kill": true,
"strict_include_paths": [],
"esxi vm kill exclude": []
```


Intricate Encryption Modes








Intricate Encryption Modes (cont.)






Intricate Encryption Modes (cont.)

```
if ( fileSize <= 10 MB_)
   Full
if (fileSize > 10 MB and fileSize <= 100 MB
   AdvancedSmartPattern[10485760, 30, 2]
if (fileSize > 100 MB and fileSize <= 1 GB)
   AdvancedSmartPattern[25165824, 10, 5]
if (fileSize > 1 GB and fileSize <= 10 GB)
   AdvancedSmartPattern[104857600, 5, 10]
if (fileSize > 10 GB and fileSize <= 100 GB
   step = fileSize/10 - 100 MB
   DotPattern[104857600, step]
if (fileSize > 100 GB and fileSize <= 1 TB)
   step = fileSize/20 - 100 MB
   DotPattern[104857600, step]
if (fileSize > 1 TB)
   step = fileSize/30 - 100 MB
   DotPattern[104857600, step]
```

```
t0+1) { db poi(@$t1)
        sql
        txt
        doc
        rtf
        pdf
       xls
        xlsx
        jpg
        jpeg
        png
       gif
        webp
        tiff
        psd
        raw
        bmp
```

Encryption Configuration Space: Measurement



Data Throughput (MB/sec.)



Wallclock Processing Time (sec.)



Unencrypted Content (%)









3 5 GB

50 GB

Encryption Configuration Space: Impact - Highlights

AES-NI vs. ChaCha20 Encryption mode: *Full*



5 GB



50 GB



+51.56 MB/sec.



-5.24 sec.



+53.76 MB/sec.



-18.42 sec.

Encryption Configuration Space: Impact - Highlights

Auto vs. Full



500 MB



50 GB



86.68 %



98.05 %



-178.51 MB/sec.



-250.37 MB/sec.




-0.82 sec.



-117.44 sec.

Encryption Configuration Space: Impact

The configuration space is *impactful*







Where are we? Where are we going?

Where Are We?








Threat actors know where they want to go **Do we?**


Where Are We Going?

Infection prevention remains an absolute priority



Where Are We Going?

Infection prevention remains an absolute priority



Where Are We Going... If Prevention Has Failed?



Detection engineering



How good are our file I/O-based detections?

Should we develop new?



What about CPU/memory performance signatures?



CPU Performance
Signatures for Security
Attacks Detection

Where Are We Going... If Prevention Has Failed?



Do we need new response logic?




Evidence gathering Verdict and response






Evidence gathering Verdict and response

Where Are We Going... If Prevention Has Failed?



Can we increase attribution confidence?



Can we better understand and estimate the malware market dynamics?

Thank you!

Aleksandar Milenkoski



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